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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(j).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 11
See Addendum.
Utah R. App. P. 24
See Addendum.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7
See Addendum.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15
See Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lorin Leavitt and Dianne Leavitt ("Leavitts") hired GDE Construction, Inc.
("GDE") to remodel their home. The Bank of American Fork ("BAF') provided

construction financing to the Leavitts, and GDE provided certain construction and lien
guarantees to BAF.
There arose certain disputes, mostly relating to cost, as the remodel progressed. As
a result, GDE filed a mechanics' lien. The Leavitts and GDE negotiated an accord to
complete the remodel, and GDE released the lien. The Leavitts satisfied the accord, yet
GDE re-recorded a mechanics' lien, and sued to foreclose the mechanics' lien and claim
additional amounts owed beyond that which had originally been agreed to with the
Leavitts in the accord.
After discovery was completed, BAF and the Leavitts filed motions for summary
judgment. The trial court found (a) that GDE had released its lien claim and had no right
to record a new mechanics' lien, (b) that there was an accord and satisfaction and GDE
had no claim to additional amounts, (c) and that GDE's guarantees to BAF were
enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed GDE's Complaint and removed its
mechanics' lien.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition
1.

On August 18, 2008, GDE filed a Complaint, naming Dianne Leavitt, Bank

of American Fork, and others as defendants. (R.12). The Summons was not served on
Dianne Leavitt until November 6, 2008. (R.51 ).

2

2.

The Leavitts, unaware that GDE had filed a Complaint, filed their own

Complaint on October 16, 2008, naming GDE as defendant. The Summons was served on
GDE on October 21, 2008. This Complaint filed by the Leavitts was later consolidated
with the Complaint filed by GDE. (R.24-37).
3.

After the expiration of the discovery period, but prior to the deadline to file

dispositive motions, the Leavitts filed their Motion for Pmiial Summary Judgment
Against GDE Construction ("Leavitt MSJ''). (R.816, 1084).
4.

BAF also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("'BAF MSJ''). (R.1108).

5.

GDE

filed

a Memorandum in

Opposition to the

Leavitt MSJ

("Opposition"), and to the BAF MSJ. (R.l929, 2025). In support of the Opposition, GDE
also filed the Declaration of Amy Eldredge in Opposition to the Leavitts' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against GDE ("Declaration"). (R.2029).
6.

On July 9, 2010, the Leavitts filed a Motion to Strike ("Leavitt Motion to

Strike") relating to the Declaration. (R.2059). On July 22, 2010, BAF filed its Motion to
Strike Portions of the Declaration of Amy Eldredge in Opposition to the Leavitts' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Against ODE ("BAF Motion to Strike"). (R.2126).
7.

A hearing for oral argument related to the motions for summary judgment

and motions to strike was held on September 13, 2010 ("llearing"). (R.2213). On
October 26, 2010, the trial court entered its Ruling RE: Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment and Motions to Strike. ("Ruling"). (R.2221, 2230).
8.

On November 8, 2010, the Leavitts filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees for

Prevailing on Lien ("Motion for Fees"). (R.2242).
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9.

On November 29, 2011, the trial court entered the "Order Striking GDE

Construction's Defense of Mutual Mistake and Portions of the Declaration of Amy
Eldredge" ("Order to Strike"). (R.2321).

· ·to.

On December 9, 2010, the trial court entered an "Order Dismissing GDE

Construction's Claims, Releasing Its Lien and Lis Pendens, Ordering It to Remove
Mountain Land Design's Lien, and Awarding Attorney's Fees to the Bank of American
Fork" ("Summary Judgment Order"). (R.2391).
11.

GDE never filed an opposition or response to the Motion for Fees, and on

January 4, 2011, the trial court entered the "Order Granting Leavitts' Motion for
Attorneys' Fees for Prevailing on Lien" ("Order on Fees").
12.

The Leavitts' Judgment was entered on January 10, 2011 ("Leavitt

Judgment"). (R.2476). BAF's Judgment was also entered on January 10, 2011 ("BAF
Judgment').
13.

On November 26, 2010, GDE filed its Reqeust for Reconsideration or

Clarification, regarding the trial court's Ruling. The denied that request on January 4,
2011. (R.2313, 2471).
14.

On January 28, 2011, GDE filed its Motion to Set Aside Judgments Entered

on January 10, 2011 and Request for 54(b) Certification and Extension of Time to File
Appeal. Prior to the deadline for memoranda in opposition from opposing parties, the
trial court entered the Order Certifying Certain Orders as Final Under Rule 54(B) and
Extending the Time to File a Notice of Appeal. (R.2534, 2624).
15.

On February 1, 2011, GDE filed its Notice of Appeal. (R.2577).
4

16.

On February 11, 2011, BAF filed its Objection to Leavitts' Writ of

Execution and Motion to: (1) Declare the Attorney Fee Order issued in Favor of the
leavitts on January 4, 2001 is Not a Final Order and Judgment; (2) Vacate Judgment
Entered 02-11-11 Filed: Defendant Bank of American Fork's Memorandum. (R.2652).
17.

On February 17, 2011, BAF filed its Motion to Set Aside "Order Certifying

Certain Orders as Final Under Rule 54(b) and Extending the Time to File a Notice of
Appeal". (R.2835).
18.

On March 15, 2011, the trial court entered a stay, and reaffirmed that stay

on April6, 2011. (R.3341, 3447).
On October 19, 2011, GDE filed the Brief of Appellant ("GDE Brf').

19.

Statement of the Facts
A.
1.

The Parties, the Project, and the Agreement
In approximately October of 2006, the Leavitts entered into an agreement

with GDE, whereby GDE would provide contractor services for the remodeling of the
Leavitts' home located at 1774 North High Country Drive, Orem, Utah ("Project").
(R.404, 558).
2.

Don Eldredge is the President of GDE, and Amy Eldredge is the Secretary

for GDE, and she is also authorized to act on GDE's behalf. (R.1433, Deposition of Amy
Eldredge ("Amy Depo") 22:16-17; R.l408, Deposition of Don Eldredge ("Don Depo"),
100: 22-23, 296: 2-10).
3.

The agreement entered into between the Leavitts and GDE in October of

2006 provided that in return for their work on the Project, GDE would be paid on a cost
5

plus 15% basis ("Agreement"). (R.404, 558, 1433, Amy Depo 74:1-12; 1546).
4.

As part of the Agreement, both parties originally agreed that the cost of the

Project would be approximately $900,000. (R.404, 558, 1408, Don Depo, 226:16-23).

··B.

Disputes as to the Cost of the Project Have Existed Since the Beginning

5.

Although the Leavitts believed 15% was a high percentage for a "cost plus"

contract in the industry, it was agreed to by the Leavitts because they understood that
they would not be charged for labor performed by GDE or GDE employees, including
but not limited to, framing and other labor performed. The Leavitts would be charged for
any material that GDE was required to provide.

These terms were included in the

Agreement. (R.1354, Deposition of Dianne Leavitt ("Dianne Depo"), 11:9-21; R.1338,
Deposition of Lorin Leavitt ("Lorin Depo"), 11:20-12:15).
6.

GDE denies that the Leavitts were not to be charged for framing labor.

(R.1379; see also Fact ~36 below).
7.

The Final Invoice includes amounts for framing labor. (See Fact ~36 below).

8.

The dollar amount GDE was charging the Leavitts for the Project changed

several times during the construction period. The original estimate was for $900,000,
which later changed to $1,200,000, then changed again to $1,600,0000, and has
subsequently increased several times. (R.1433, Amy Depo., 60:8-21; R.l408, Don Depo.
231: 1-16; see also Fact ~~11 and 19 below).
9.

When the Leavitts were informed of the increase to $1,600,000 by Amy

Eldredge, a principal of GDE, the Leavitts were shocked. They had not been given any
warning or indication that there would be another price increase, and certainly not such a
6

large increase. (R.1354, Dianne Depo, 55:2-7, 57:7-12; R.1338, Lorin Depo., 45:846: 12).
10.

In or about October of 2007, despite the price changes from $900,000 to

$1,200,000 to $1,600,000, Amy Eldredge told the Leavitts that they would need another
$400,000 to complete the Project, and as a result, Lorin requested a meeting. (R.1338,
Lorin Depo., 52:2-53:14; R.1354, Dianne Depo., 62:9-63:6).
11.

In October of 2007, Lorin Leavitt met with the principals of GDE, Don

Eldredge and Amy Eldredge ("GDE Principals") to discuss the balance of the cost of the
Project ("October 2007 Meeting"). (R.1408, Don Depo., 137: 24-138:12).
12.

At the October 2007 Meeting, Don Eldredge presented to Lorin Leavitt a

handwritten list of items still needing to be paid for on the Project, including items that
were completed and items that still needed to be completed, and it also showed a grand
total of how much was still owing at that time. The grand total of what was still owed as
shown on the List was $1,005,788.15 (the "List"). (R.1408, Don Depo., 142:14-144:3,
148:6-25; R.1325).
13.

Prior to the October 2007 Meeting, the Leavitts were already in the process

of obtaining a second construction loan from Bank of American Fork for $600,000,
which GDE knew about, which loan was finalized on December 4, 2007; so practically,
the amount that would still be owed was approximately $400,000. (R.1408, Don Depo.
145:23-146: 14).
14.

At the October 2007 Meeting, the parties agreed that the Leavitts would pay

$400,000. The Leavitts would provide $150,000 up front, and $250,000 would come
7

from a second mortgage after completion. (R.401, 1338, Lorin Depo., 59:13-20).
15.

GDE denies that the parties reached any agreement related to $400,000 at the

October 2007 Meeting. (R.13 77-13 79).
16.

Soon after the October 2007 Meeting, the Leavitts paid $150,000 to the bank

which was ultimately disbursed for Project costs. (R.l338, Lorin Depo., 66:7-16).
17.

Since the October 2007 Meeting, the Leavitts have also paid an additional

approximately $127,000 directly to subcontractors for Project costs. (R.1338, Lorin
Depo., 113:11-114:3).
18.

According to GDE, the total amount of the Project is now approximately

$2.4 million. (R.l408, Don Depo., 9:14-17; 226:24-227:1).
C.
19.

Leavitts and GDE Reach an Accord, Which the Leavitts Satisfied
In March of 2008, the Leavitts and GDE Principals met again, at which

meeting GDE informed the Leavitts that GDE had recorded a lien on the property for
$140,000 on March 18, 2008 ("First Lien"). (R.400, 556, 1322).
20.

The First Lien prevented the Leavitts from obtaining permanent financing.

The Leavitts requested that GDE remove the First Lien, but GDE refused. (R.l338, Lorin
Depo., 74:3-75:10; R.l354, Dianne Depo., 106:6-11, 158:8-17; R.1463).
21.

At the meeting in March of 2008 discussed above, when GDE presented the

First Lien which had been recorded, the Leavitts were willing to negotiate terms to be
able to pay GDE what GDE thought they were owed ("Help us make terms with what
you think you're owed"). (R.1354, Dianne Depo., 101:2-102:3, 110:15-111:13,
157:16-158:17).
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22.

Four days after the initial meeting regarding the First Lien, GDE produced a

Promissory Note and Trust Deed, and represented to the Leavitts that if the Leavitts
signed the documents, GDE would release the First Lien. The Promissory Note was for
$150,000. (R.400, 556, 1317).
23.

The Trust Deed provided as collateral property owned by Dianne Leavitt in

Washington County, State of Utah, more accurately described as follows: CLIFFS OF
SNOW CANYON H (SG) LOT 214. (R.1315).
24.

In order for GDE to agree to release First Lien, the Leavitts were required to

sign the Promissory Note. Once the promissory note was signed, the First Lien was
released. (R.1408, Don Depo., 175: 17-24).
25.

GDE prepared and recorded a Release of Mechanic's Lien on April 3, 2008

(hereinafter the "Release of Lien"). (R.1408, Don Depo. 176: 1-8; R.1433, Amy Depo.,
11:11-13:5; R.1313).
26.

GDE's intent in recording the Release of Lien was to release the First Lien,

and that was because GDE had received the Promissory Note & Trust Deed. (R.1433,
Amy Depo., 11:11-13:5).
27.

The Release of Lien states: "PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the

Mechanic's Lien claimed by GDE .. .is hereby released, the claim having been fully paid
and satisfied and that the Mechanic's Lien .. .is hereby satisfied and discharged."
(R.1313).
D.

28.

GDE Records Additional Liens

On or about July 10, 2008, the Leavitts discovered that GDE had re-recorded
9

a lien on June 25, 2008, this one for $150,000, but alleging the same dates of service as
the First Lien ("Second Lien"). (R.1354, Dianne Depo., 127:22-128:5, 145:7-8;
R.1311).
29.

Even though the First Lien showed an amount owed of $140,000, and the

Second Lien showed $150,000, no additional work had been performed between the
filing of the two liens. GDE had simply recalculated the fees owed to it. (R.1408, Don
Depo., 179: 5-23).
30.

According to GDE, the purpose of filing the Second Lien was because the

terms of the Promissory Note had not been met. (R.1408, Don Depo. 178: 19-22,
212:22-213:1; R.1433, Amy Depo., 13:6-14:2).
31.

According to GDE, if the Leavitts had paid the Promissory Note in full, then

GDE would not be owed anything and GDE's debt would have been satisfied in full.
(R.l433, Amy Depo., 130:17-132:23).
32.

On July 16, 2008, GDE recorded an amended lien for $563,690.45

("Amended Lien"). (R.1308).
33.

The Amended Lien, and the amounts claimed in this lawsuit, include the

$150,000 GDE claims it is owed and for which the Leavitts provided the Promissory
Note. (R.1433, Amy Depo., 130:17-132:23).
34.

On August 13,2008, GDE filed its Complaint against the Leavitts. (R.12).

35.

On August 18, 2008, GDE caused to be recorded a Notice of Default and

Election to Sell, with respect to the Trust Deed ("Notice of Default"). (R.1305).

10

E.

GDE's Current Lien Claims Amounts That GDE Admits It Was Never

36.

On October 8, 2008, GDE sent a letter demanding payment from the Leavitts

Owed

("Demand Letter"), in which GDE referenced a final invoice for $146,332.05 ("Final
Invoice"). (R.l302, 1299).
37.

As part of responses to discovery requests propounded after commencement

of this lawsuit, GDE provided a spreadsheet showing the amounts still allegedly owed to
subcontractors who performed work on the Project ("Sub Spreadsheet"). (R.1294).
38.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to Carl C. Nelson

Painting for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's
Amended Lien includes the amount owed to Carl C. Nelson Painting, and GDE also
charged the Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by Carl C. Nelson Painting.
(R. 1433, Amy Depo. 77:18-25, 78:13-79:14, 134:7-12; R.1299, 1294).
39.

GDE believes that it does not owe any money to Cascade Pool for the work

it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's Amended Lien
includes the amount owed to Cascade Pool, and GDE also charged the Leavitts the 15%
general fee for work performed by Cascade Pool. (R.1433, Amy Depo., 79:15-17, 80:516, 134: 7-14; R.1299, 1294).
40.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to Home & Office

Technologies for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in
GDE's Amended Lien includes the amount owed to Home & Office Technologies, and
GDE also charged the Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by Home &
11

Office Technologies. (R.1433, Amy Depo., 80:17-81:7, 135: 16-18; R.1299).
41.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to Interiors

Unlimited for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in
GDE's Amended Lien includes the amount owed to Interiors Unlimited, and GDE also
charged the Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by Interiors Unlimited.
(R.1408, Don Depo. 185:3-15; R.l433, Amy Depo., 135:16-20; R.1294).
42.

GDE believes that it does not owe any money to Lighting Specialists for the

work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's Amended Lien
includes the amount owed to Lighting Specialists, and GDE also charged the Leavi1ts the
15% general fee for work performed by Lighting Specialists. (R.1433, Amy Depo.,
81:11-20, 137:3-7; R.1299, 1294).
43.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to MBA Electric

for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's
Amended Lien includes the amount owed to MBA Electric, and GDE also charged the
Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by MBA Electric. (R.1408, Don Depo.,
184:3-11; R.1433, Amy Depo. 137:14-16; R.1299, 1294).
44.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to Mountainland

Design for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's
Amended Lien includes the amount owed to Mountainland Design, and GDE also
charged the Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by Mountainland Design.
(R.l433, Amy Depo., 81:21-82:14, 137: 17-18; R.l299, 1294).
45.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to Orion Outdoor
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Lighting for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in
GDE's Amended Lien includes the amount owed to Orion Outdoor Lighting, and GDE
also charged the Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by Orion Outdoor
Lighting. (R.l433, Amy Depo., 82:19-83:5, 137:17-22; R.l299, 1294).
46.

GDE believes it has no contract with and owes no money to R&M Woods

for the work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's
Amended Lien includes the amount owed to R&M Woods, and GDE also charged the
Leavitts the 15% general fee for work performed by R&M Woods. (R.1408, Don Depo.
184:12-185:2; R.l433, Amy Depo., 138: 2-4; R. 1299, 1294).
47.

GDE believes that it does not owe any money to Total Protection for the

work it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's Amended Lien
includes the amount owed to Total Protection, and GDE also charged the Leavitts the
15% general fee for work performed by Total Protection. (R.l433, Amy Depo., 83:2084:4, 138:15-16; R.1299, 1294).
48.

According to GDE, of the subcontractors listed above with whom GDE

believes it had no contract, GDE did not direct the work of those subcontractors, but their
work was directed by the Leavitts, and yet, GDE still charged the 15% general fee for
those subcontractors listed above. (R.l433, Amy Depo., 139:4-7; see also Fact ~~37-46
above).
49.

GDE was not owed any money from the ten subcontractors listed above, but

GDE intentionally included those amounts in its Amended Lien. GDE's reason for
claiming amounts in a lien although such amounts were not owed to it was because GDE
13

was afraid it might get sued. (R.l408, Don Depo., 247:14-248:10; R.1433, Amy Depo.
14:7-15:5; R.l294).
50.

GDE was afraid it might get sued, but yet it cannot recall whether any

subcontractors had suggested or threatened they would sue at the time GDE filed the
Amended Lien. (R.l433, Amy Depo., 14:7-15:5).
51.

The total amount claimed by the ten subcontractors listed above

IS

$301,377.39. (R.l294).
52.

In addition to the ten subcontractors discussed above, GDE apparently does

not know whether it has a contract with or owes money to Comaby Railing for the work
it performed on the Project, however, the amount claimed in GDE's Amended Lien
includes the amount owed to Comaby Railing, and GDE also charged the Leavitts the
15% general fee for work performed by Comaby Railing. (R.l433, Amy Depo., 80:3-16,
135:14-15).
53.

The total amount claimed by the ten subcontractors mentioned above, plus

Comaby Railing, is $323,172.99. (R.1294).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Brief of Appellant fails to meet the standard set forth in the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and the deficiencies should be considered fatal to Appellant's
appeal.
The Brief of Appellant argues that the trial court erred in striking the affirmative
defense of mutual mistake, along with a paragraph of a declaration. However, the
affirmative defense of mutual mistake was not specifically pled, and neither the defense
nor the underlying facts were raised until the dispositive motion stage of proceedingsafter discovery had concluded. Further, the paragraph of the declaration which was
stricken relied on inadmissible hearsay, was not admissible or relevant, and only related
to the disallowed affirmative defense, and therefore was properly stricken.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that an accord and satisfaction
existed. Both at the trial court and appellate level, Appellant has simply concluded in
argument that there were disputed facts, but at the trial court level Appellant never
actually disputed any material fact related to the accord and satisfaction, and the
statement of facts in the Brief of Appellant does not point to any specific facts.
Appellants Docketing Statement listed more issues than Appellant actually argued
in the Brief of Appellant. Where Appellant has failed to argue an issue in its Brief of
Appellant, any appeal of such issue is waived and such issue should not be considered.
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ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANTS FAILED TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE,
AND THEREFORE THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

A.

Appellant Failed to Provide a Transcript ofAll Relevant Evidence and
Proceedings.

The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that within 10 days of filing the
notice of appeal the appellant "shall file with the clerk of the appellate court a written
request for transcript, specifying the entire proceeding or parts of the proceeding to be
transcribed that are not already on file." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(l). If no such transcript is
to be requested, the appellant "shall a certificate to that effect." Id. Furthermore, "unless
the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall ... file a statement of the issues
that will be presented on appeal," and if the appellee believes a transcript or other parts of
the proceedings to be necessary, appellee shall file a designation of additional parts to be
included. Utah R. App. P. 11 (e)(3). This necessary designation by appellant provides
appellee( s) with the opportunity to obtain necessary transcripts if appellant does not
intend to provide them.
On September 13, 2010, the trial court held the Hearing to hear oral argument on
the Leavitts' MSJ and Motion to Strike, and the BAF MSJ and Motion to Strike. A
review of the appellate record shows that no transcript has been provided for the earing.
Appellant was provided written notice from the Court on March 4, 2011, and May 2,
2011, informing Appellant that no Request for Transcript had been provided. Appellant
failed to correct this deficiency.
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B.

The Brief ofAppellant Failed to Provide a Statement of the Issues
Presented and the Other Necessary Information

The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require the brief of appellant to contain the
following, among other things:
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative ... shall be set out verbatim with the
appropriate citation.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shallfirst indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph
(e) of this rule.
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph.
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5), (6), (7) (emphasis added). The Brief of Appellant has failed to
provide this information or follow these rules. The Brief of Appellant fails to provide a
statement of the issues presented for review, and also fails to provide the standard of
appellate review for each issue, a citation to the record showing each issue was preserved,
and/or a statement of grounds seeking review of an issue not preserved. 1 Verbatim

1 The

Brief of Appellant does state that
"[o]n the merits, GDE appeals threes issues: 1) whether the trial court properly struck the defense
of mutual mistake and portions of the Declaration of Amy Eldredge; 2) whether the trial court
properly found that there was an accord and satisfaction between the Leavitts and GDE; and 3)
whether the trial court properly ruled that the First and Second Guaranties are enforceable against
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citation of determinative statutes and rules was not provided. Appellant failed to properly
set forth a statement of the case. Although Appellant did provide statement of facts and
appears to have provided the course proceedings and disposition below, Appellant did so
incorrectly. The items are listed in reverse order, and more important, Appellant failed to
properly cite to the record for each of the facts stated? Finally, Appellant failed to
provide any addendum items, even though there are items which are of central
importance that should have been included (i.e. findings of fact and conclusions of law,
ruling, etc.) 3 The appellees, and the Court, are thus left to guess as to which issues
Appellant is seeking review. The statement of issues and related items are also of
particular importance for this particular brief of appellant because Brief of Appellant has
stated several facts and made several arguments for the first time, and without a statement

GDE."
(GDE Brf, 21). However, this statement is found in the Argument section of the Brief of Appellant, and it
fails to provide any of the other requisite information related to a statement of the issues.
2 Once the Comi has the opportunity to carefully review the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant, it will
become apparent that Appellant's citations to the record are essentially of no value. Rather than actually citing to the
portion of the record where a particular fact is demonstrated to be part of the record, Appellant cites to the first page
of various pleadings. Rather than pointing to exhibits and documents which were included with the parties' various
pleadings, Appellant cites to the first page of a pleading. Citing the first page is acceptable when providing the
procedural history, but not facts. Of even more concern, the pleadings to which Appellant cites are inelevant. For
example, on Statement of Fact Nos. 3, 5, 9, 11, and 32 (which as argued more fully below, are facts which were
never made a part of the trial record at all), Appellant's citation to the record (1084) is the first page of the Leavitts'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GDE Construction, Inc .. The citation is not to the Memorandum in
Support thereof which contains a statement of facts and includes various exhibits, but rather Appellant cites to the
first page of a pleading which is one page long. In addition to those facts, Statement of Fact Nos. 19, 24, 25, 34, and
46 were never made a part of the record, or in the very least, are distortions of facts. A primary basis upon which the
trial court granted the various motions for summary judgment is because failed to (or could not) dispute the material
facts which were before the trial court. At the trial level, GDE claimed the facts were disputed, but did not actually
dispute the facts. Once again, Appellant now argues that the facts were disputed, but fails to even properly identify
which facts are part of the trial record.
3 Leavitts assume that GDE did not provide any addendum items. GDE has yet to provide the Leavitts (or BAF) with
a physical copy of the Brief of Appellant, only an unsigned PDF of the Brief which was emailed. The unsigned PDF
does not include an addendum, and does not reference an addendum or state that no addendum was needed. The
Leavitts (and BAF) have also not received a CD pursuant to Standing Order No.8. On December 7, 2011, counsel
for Leavitts sent a reply email to counsel for GDE asking for a copy of the Brief of Appellant, a CD, or at least
confirmation that there is no addendum. Counsel for Leavitts sent another email on December 15, 2011. Counsel for
GDE has not responded to either email or provided a copy or CD.
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of the issues and proper citation to the record, it is unclear whether the facts are actually
part of the record, and whether the arguments are central to issues under review, or
merely collateral.

C.

Failure by Appellant to Follow the Rules Should Result in Dismissal of the
Appeal

In C.M.C. Cassity, Inc. v. Aird, 707 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court relied on long-standing precedent and dismissed an appeal based on appellant's
failure to follow the applicable rules. In that case, the appellant
failed to file a docketing statement as required by Rule 73A of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.A.P. 9), a designation of the contents of the
record on appeal, as required by Rule 75(a) (U.R.A.P. ll(d)), or a
certificate that a transcript has been ordered as required by Rule 75(a)(l)
(U.R.A.P. ll(e)). The brief filed by [appellant] did not comply with the
requirements for briefs set forth in Rule 75(p)(2) (U.R.A.P. 24) in that,
among other things, it contained no table of contents, no index of
authorities cited, and no citations to the record in the statement of facts.

C.M.C. Cassity, 707 P.2d at 1305. In our particular case, Appellant failed to request a
transcript as required by Utah R. App. P. 11 (e)(1 ), failed to designate which portions of
the proceedings would be necessary, as required by Utah R. App. P. ll(e)(3), failed to
provide a statement of the issues presented for review, and accompanying requisite
information, as required by Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5), failed to provide a verbatim cite of
determinative statutes, rules, etc., as required by Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(6), failed to
correctly provide a statement of the case and facts, as required by Utah R. App. P. 24
(a)(7), and Appellant failed to properly address the addendum, as required by Utah R.
App. P. 24 (a)(ll). The court in C.M.C. Cassity dismissed that appeal for less. The
present appeal should be dismissed.
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In the event that this Court is not inclined to dismiss the appeal, the trial court's
judgment should be presumed to be valid in light of Appellant's failure to follow the
rules. An appellant is required to provide a transcript, and "[n ]either the court nor the
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions
of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. ll(e)(2). Appellants failed to provide a transcript of
the Hearing, and this Court has held that in such situations the judgment being appealed
is presumed to be valid. "Since counsel failed to provide this court with all relevant
evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2),
we can only presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." State v.
Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (citing Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & Cattle
Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bevan v. JH. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442,
443 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ~~26-28 (Utah 2002). The appeal
should be dismissed, or in the least, the trial court's judgment should be presumed to be
valid.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE
DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE AND PORTIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF AMY
ELDREDGE

GDE cannot raise an affirmative defense for the first time at the dispositive motion
stage because affirmative defenses must be raised at the initial pleading stage or they are
waived. Furthermore, portions of the Declaration should be stricken and disregarded
because they (a) rely upon hearsay, and (b) they pertain to an affirmative defense which
was not properly pled.
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A.

GDE Cannot Raise an Affirmative Defense for the First Time At The
Dispositive Motion Stage.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[m ]utual mistake is an affirmative defense
as it raises matters outside the plaintiffs' prima facie case, and the failure to assert it is a
waiver of that defense." Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah
1984) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(h); Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., Utah, 666
P.2d 876 (1983). In Mabey, the court held that mutual mistake had "not been raised as a
defense nor was it made a claim," and that "Rule 9(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure] requires that in all averments of mistake, the circumstances constituting
mistake shall be stated with particularity." !d. (citations omitted); see also Resolution

Trust. Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 792 (9th Cir. Cal. 1994) (holding
that mutual mistake consistently has been recognized as an affirmative defense, one
which is waived if not included in a party's first response to an opponent's pleading.)
GDE acknowledges that the holding in Mabey is correct and that "mutual mistake
must be affirmatively pled." (GDE Brf, 24-25).

GDE did not specifically raise the

defense of mutual mistake in any of its pleadings. The Brief of Appellant acknowledges
this fact. GDE argues that its list of affirmative defenses set forth in its initial pleadings
included a catchall statement: "and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense as may be disclosed through discovery." (GDE Brf, 24). However,
GDE cites not case law which would allow a party to simply make a broad statement
such as this. Allowing such a catchall statement defeats the entire purpose of requiring
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that affirmative defenses be specifically pled: notice. 4 Nearly two years after the initiation
of this lawsuit, GDE raised for the first time the idea that there was a mutual mistake. As
a matter of law, any such defense was waived long ago, and cannot be raised simply
because GDE faced the prospect of summary judgment. The factual and expert discovery
times have expired, and the Leavitts (and other parties) would be prejudiced if GDE were
allowed at such a late stage to raise an affirmative defense, which as shown below,
fundamentally alters positions they have taken previously. The argument section of
GDE's Opposition relating to mutual mistake should be stricken and disregarded. 5
GDE next argues that issues which are tried by express or implied consent shall be
treated as if they had been properly raised, citing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15.
(GDE Brf, 25-26). However, GDE's new defense of mutual mistake was not tried by
express or implied consent. At the first moment that GDE raised that argument, in its
Opposition, both the Leavitts and BAF immediately filed motions to strike. JV[utual
mistake has neither been expressly or implicitly allowed, whether at trial or in motions.
GDE further claims that the "facts surrounding mutual mistake have already been
developed and there is no need for further discovery." (GDE Brf, 26). This is incorrect.
Mutual mistake, and the underlying facts that GDE now alleges, are entirely new. The
underlying facts were not even part of the deposition, hence the reason GDE provided the
Declaration, rather than simply cite to the deposition transcript(s). 6 The course and scope

4 From the Ruling: "A catchall statement does not comply with the purpose of the Rule. The purpose is to put the
?pposing party on notice of what the patiy claims as defenses." (R.2229).
) Even if GDE were allowed to raise such a defense, it would be futile, as argued in the Leavitts' Memorandum in
Support of the Leavitt MSJ. (R.2111-2114).
6 As argued by BAF in its Reply Memorandum in support of the BAF Motion to Strike, the concept of a mistake
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of discovery would be fundamentally altered had GDE at any point raised even the
suggestion it now argues regarding mutual mistake.
GDE also argues, perhaps as some justification for allowing it to maintain a
defense of mutual mistake, that the Leavitts' argument of accord and satisfaction "had not
been previously raised." (GDE Brf, 26). This is incorrect. The Amended Answer and
Cross Claim of Dianne Leavitt to PlaintiffGDE Construction's First Amended Complaint
specifically lists accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense. (R.354). Furthermore,
the underlying fact pattern was specifically pled in the First Amended Verified Complaint
of Lorin & Dianne Leavitt, (R. 400-402), so GDE cannot claim it was either unaware of
the defense, or of the underlying facts.

B.

Paragraph 5 of the Declaration Relies on Inadmissible Hearsay, and
Pertains to an Affirmative Defense Which Was Not Properly Pled

In paragraph 5 of the Declaration, Amy Eldredge states that "I was told by the
Leavitts that the only condition precedent to the granting of a loan by Citywide Home
Loans was the release of the First Lien." (R.2027). This statement is hearsay within
hearsay, or as it is referred to, double hearsay, because there was the alleged statement
from the Leavitts to Amy Eldredge, and there was also the alleged statement(s) from
Citywide Home Loans to the Leavitts. "'[D]ouble hearsay is admissible if both aspects
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule .... " State v. Schreuder, 726 P .2d 1215,
1231 (Utah 1986). An affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.
Ut. R. Civ. P. 56( e). "An affidavit that does not measure up to the standards of 56( e) is

relating to the promissory note and trust deed was never raised during the Eldredge depositions. (R.2191-92).
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subject to a motion to strike." Hawick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 66 (Utah
1972).
The alleged statement from the Leavitts to Amy Eldredge is likely excluded from
the hearsay rule as an admission by a party opponent. However, there is no exception to
the alleged statement from Citywide Home Loans to the Leavitts. It was therefore correct
for the trial court to strike paragraph 5 as inadmissible hearsay.
GDE argues that the alleged statement from Citywide to the Leavitts is not being
offered for the truth of the matter, "but rather the effect on the listener," and is therefore
not hearsay. (GDE Brf, 21). GDE is attempting to use this statement to support its newlycrafted defense of mutual mistake, and therefore it is in fact being offered for the truth of
the matter. Even if this Court holds that the Citywide-to-Leavitt portion of the statement
is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, then the affidavit should still be
stricken, because an affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The statement does not meet the basic requirement of relevance:
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact. .. more probable or less
probable that it would without the evidence." Ut. R. Evid. 401. GDE knew or should have
known that this alleged statement from Citywide to the Leavitts was untrue. GDE itself
relied upon and attached to its Opposition as Exhibit F, the March 26, 2008 letter from
Citywide Home Loans to Dianne Leavitt, (R.1930), prior to the Leavitt Motion to Strike
being filed (R.2059). The letter states that the First Lien was preventing the loan from
being finalized, but the letter makes no guarantees, promises, or representations that the
loan would assuredly be completed once the First Lien was taken off. It is very different
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to state that a lien is preventing financing than to say removal of a lien will automatically
result in financing. The statement is therefore inadmissible hearsay and/or not relevant,
and paragraph 5 was properly stricken.
The trial court also struck paragraph 6 of the Declaration. GDE does not appeal
that decision; however the trial court's reason for striking paragraph 6 is also further
justification for striking paragraph 5. The trial court indicated that it would "not consider
the sixth paragraph of Mrs. Eldredge's affidavit as it pertains to the affirmative defense of
mutual mistake." (R.2229). This reasoning is also applicable to paragraph 5, because
GDE's purpose in offering paragraph 5 of the Declaration was to further their new
argument of mutual mistake. The defense of mutual mistake was properly stricken, and
therefore paragraph 5 would serve no purpose independent of an attempt to establish
mutual mistake. The trial correctly struck paragraph 5 of the Declaration.
Ill.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
EXISTED BETWEEN THE LEA VITTS AND GDE

As argued above, the Brief of Appellant fails to include a statement of the issues
presented for review as required by Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. However, as part of the Argument section, the Brief of Appellant does
identify three issues that GDE appears to be appealing/ one of which includes "whether
the trial court properly found that there was an accord and satisfaction between the
Leavitts and GDE." (GDE Brf, 21).

7

See fn. 1, supra.
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As part of its argument challenging the trial court's Ruling and Summary
Judgment Order regarding accord and satisfaction, GDE first sets forth the elements of
accord and satisfaction: "1) that the amount is unliquidated and disputed; 2) that payment
is made in satisfaction of the debt; and 3) that the creditor accept the payment as full
satisfaction." (GDE Brf, 27) (citing Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 84 P.3d
1154, 1158 (Utah 2003)). GDE then states that "the undisputed facts of this case show
that none of the three elements [of accord and satisfaction] were met." (GDE Brf, 27).
To the contrary, the Summary Judgment Order contained specific undisputed facts
which set forth that an accord and satisfaction had been reached. (R. 2385-88,

~~14-38).

Specifically, the Summary Judgment Order set forth (a) that there was a dispute as to the
actual amount owed, (R.2385-88, ,-[,-[1 0-22), (b) that the Leavitts provided payment to
GDE, (R.2386, ,-[29), and (c) that GDE accepted the payment (R.2386, ,-[33). 8
The Brief of Appellant attempts to argue that there were disputed facts, even in
some instances raising facts for the first time. There were no disputes as to any material
facts at the trial court level. GDE's Opposition failed create an issue of material fact.
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a memorandum in oppositJlon to
a motion for summary judgment which controverts the moving party's facts shall be
"supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials,"
Ut. R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B), and each fact in the moving party's memorandum "is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding

8

The Ruling also addressed the lack of dispute on those factual issues, and stated that "the Leavitts have satisfied the
requirements of accord and satisfaction; therefore the breach of contract claim is dismissed." (R. 2228).
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party." Ut. R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). Likewise, Rule 56(e) states that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings," but must "set for the specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." Ut. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In the Leavitts' Memorandum in Support of the Leavitt MSJ, the Leavitts set forth
53 undisputed facts. (R.l453-1463). In a footnote on page 3 of its Opposition, GDE
indicates that some of the Leavitts facts were denied in GDE's Answer. (R.2023). Resting
upon the allegations or denials of a pleading is specifically disallowed by Rule 56(e).
Also, GDE's Opposition pointed to several of the Leavitts' facts which GDE found to be
irrelevant, but GDE did not controvert the correctness thereof, nor did it cite any
materials in an attempt to controvert. GDE failed to dispute the facts set forth by the
Leavitts, failing to even address some of the facts, and certainly failing to cite to
supporting evidence which might create a dispute. (R.2021-2023).
The second paragraph of the argument section of GDE's Opposition states as
follows: "As will be demonstrated, this matter is replete with disputed issues of fact
precluding summary judgment." (R.2018). GDE was mistaken as to its burden and the
manner of procedure at the summary judgment stage. The argument section of a
memorandum in opposition was not the time to dispute facts. A memorandum in
opposition "shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that
is controverted ... [and] [f]or each of the moving party's fact that is controverted, the
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Ut. R. Civ. P.
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7(c)(3)(B). GDE failed to controvert the Leavitts' facts, and thus they were admitted.
"Once the moving party has challenged the nonmoving party's case on [summary
judgment], the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ~16;
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather than fulfill its burden by providing admissible
evidence, GDE relied on baseless assertions and overstates what little evidence that it
attempted to present to the trial curt. It was GDE's burden to bear, and neither the trial
court nor this Court should rescue GDE from its failure to meet that burden. Where there
is no dispute of material fact, the Court should view the arguments of the Leavitts from a
legal standpoint only, the requisite facts having been admitted. A review of the summary
judgment memoranda will show that the undisputed facts as set forth in the Summary
Judgment Order were in fact undisputed. 9
The Brief of Appellant argues that the promissory note "was never meant to be
payment," and "was never meant to be enforceable." (GDE Brf, 27-28). These statements
are unsupported, and are completely contradictory to the specific finding of the trial court
that "GDE accepted the Promissory Note as payment. (R.2386,

~33).

GDE cites no

supporting evidence for these statements, or any reason why this Court should rely on the
GDE's current representations rather than the trial court's order.
The Brief of Appellant also argues that "the Leavitts have expressly disclaimed
any obligation to pay under the Note, and indeed, sought a temporary restraining order

9

BAF also set forth a significant number of facts, (R.l837-1850), some similar to that of the Leavitts, and GDE
likewise failed to dispute any material fact. (R.1922-1929)
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preventing GDE's action to foreclose." (GDE Brf, 28). First, the inconsistency of GDE's
arguments is glaring. In one paragraph, GDE asserts that the promissory note was never
meant to be payment or be enforceable. In the very next paragraph, GDE unwittingly
acknowledges that they attempted to foreclose on the collateral which had been provided
to secure the promissory note. If the note was never intended as payment, or was never
intended to be enforceable, why then would GDE attempt to foreclose the collateral in
response to the Leavitts' alleged failure to pay the note? The answer is that the note was
always intended to be payment, was always meant to be enforceable, and GDE never
disputed that fact at the trial court level. Second, GDE voluntarily stipulated to a
preliminary injunction as to the foreclosure until after this matter had been resolved.
(R.2021 ). And third, GDE again fails to cite to the record as to where this issue of
disclaimer was raised at the trial court level. Even if that issue had been raised, it is not
persuasive. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to plead in the
alternative. 8(e). GDE sued the Leavitts claiming GDE was owed a significant amount of
money. The Leavitts believed an accord and satisfaction had been reached, but if a court
were to find that there was no accord, then for what purpose had the Leavitts given the
promissory note and trust deed. The purpose of the note and deed was to finalize the
accord between the Leavitts and GDE, that was the purpose as represented by GDE, but
if the note and deed did not actually resolve the dispute, then the Leavitts had been
fraudulently induced into signing that note and deed. The Leavitts pled in the alternative,
but the trial court correctly found that there was in fact an accord and satisfaction. 10
10

The Leavitts have not disclaimed any obligation to pay under the note. In support of that stance, this Court can see
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GDE admitted the correctness of all facts which it failed to specifically controvert
by citation to relevant materials. The trial court found that an accord and satisfaction had
been reached based upon the undisputed facts that were before the trial court.
IV.

ANY ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN GDE'S DOCKETING STATEMENT, BUT NOT ARGUED
IN THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, ARE WAIVED AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED

In GDE's Docketing Statement, GDE listed seven issues on appeal. However, in
the Brief of Appellant, GDE only cites three issues, and even those three issues were not
correctly listed, as argued above. (GDE Brf, 21). In Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 89.5 P.2d
391 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court held that were the appellant had failed to analyze
the individual rulings, and instead simply attached portions of a transcript and "invite[ d]
[the court] to ferret out the errors and make her arguments for her." Rasmussen v.

Sharapata, 895 P.2d at 392. This Court concluded that "[t]his will not do." !d.
Similarly, although GDE may have listed certain issues in the Docketing
Statement, it has not presented those Issue in the Brief of Appellant, and neither
Appellees nor this Court should be required to guess as to what basis GDE might have to
argue the alleged errors committed by the trial court. Accordingly, any issues not
addressed in the Brief of Appellant should not be considered by this Court, and should be
disregarded.

from the record that the Leavitts served a writ of execution upon GDE in an attempt to recover the original
promissory note. BAF and another party have also served similar writs, and that issue is awaiting resolution in the
trial court.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision, and deny Appellant's appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

21st day of December, 20 11.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

\ ~)1.GJ
JAM'i§' GARDNER
Attorney for the Leavitts/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of December, 2011, I caused a copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be sent via U.S. Mail to the following:

Randy B. Birch
114 South 200 West
PO Box 763
Heber City, UT 84032

Felicia B. Canfield
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323
Attorneys for Bank ofAmerican Fork

Daniel R. Widdison
Tesch Law Offices
314 Main Street, Suite 201
PO Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060-3390
Attorneys for GDE Construction, Inc.
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

Ruling

..·r

.

FilED
OCT 2 S 2010
.me·~

81'A"''EOFUTM
m"M

cOOtn'Y+-v

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
. IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GDE CONSTRUCTION, INC., aUtah
Corporation,

:RULiNG RE: Motions for Parti31 Summary
Judgment and Motions to Strike

Piamtitt ·

v.

Date: October 21, 2010
Case No. 080402840

DIANNE W. LEAvm, an individual; BANK OF
AMERICAN FORK; INTERIORS UNLIMlTED, Judge Steven L. Hansen
LC dba STEVE PETERSON INTERIORS;
Divisioni
MOUNTAJNLAND DESIGN, lNC.,; MBA
ELECTRIC LC; NOORDA ARCffiTBCTURAL
METALS; lNC.; THE DRYWALL SURGEONS
OF UTAH; INC.; LIGHTING SPECIALtsTS,
INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants.

.·J .; ,

There are four pending motions before the Court, including two Motions to Strike Portions of

..

... ·

; AmyEldtedge's Affidavit and two Motions for Summary Judgment. On SepteD:tber 13,2010, the
'

'

. parties pamcipated.in orBl arguments before the Court pursuant to the four motionS. ·
Having reviewed the parties' briefs; being fully advised in the premises~ and good cause
· appearing, the Court now makes the following R,uling:

RULiNG
Motions to Strike.
..·.: The court ~ates the argUments and finds then! consistent with the pleadings submitted. The
...... -···-·. ····· ····---....,.-

-~·-··-·"·--·-·----

..

·--····--·· ..

--- -.... -

_

...

___ ......
,

,.

·-·-----..·--·.. -·-··-----·---··-·--·-· -- ..

Col;IIt :finds that Rule 8(c) requires that parties "shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.;'' A catchall statement doe~ not comply with the .
Page 1 of 5

___

purpose of the Rule. The purpose is to put the opposmg party on notice of what the party claims as
·defenses. 'This Court finds that the affirmative defense of mutual mistake has been waived by GDE and

·. · ·..(vm s1:rijce an portions of the affidavit and memorandum which were :filCd in support ofG:OB;s
.affinnative· defense.
. . .
Secondly, as to the fifth paragraph of Amy :Eldredge;s·a:ffidaVit; the Court :futds that it is bailed

on inadmisSl'ble double hearsay; therefore, the Court will not considet it for plli'}loseimfthe summary
judgment motion. This paragraph is stricken from the affidavit for lack of :foundation. As to the siXth
paragraph ofMrs. Eldredge's affidavit, the Court notes that thiS paragraph is inConsistent with prior

. ·. . .: .~tatetnents fu.ade by Mrs. Eltkedge, as well as statements made by D~~ Eldredge, aprinciple of GDE.
·Generiilly, an inconsistent stateJiient alone not a sufficient reason to strike a paragraph-the consistency ·
ofMrs. Eldredge's sbrtements is a question offa.ct and goes to ctedibilizy, not admissibility.
Nevertheless, the Court will not consider the six:th paragraph of Mrs. Eldredge's affidavit a.S it pertains
to the affinnative defense of mutual niistake.
.:

·.·

. '•

.·

~

..

The Coint finds that the parties do not diSpute that the initia1 ~en on the subject property was
released when·Plaintiff:filed a notice of satist'action on April3, 2008. Then oil June 25, 2008, Plaintiff ·
recorded a second lien alleging monies owed for services perfumed on the same dates as the first lien.

--(6cteber "i o: 'ioo6-~-.Aprif3I>:-zoos):-.After· filliig tlie seeona lien; P1iintiff'filed-an-.Alriended.Lieif .... -- -~ ~--·-·:- -·--- ·claiming, again, servic.es petfonned ~n the same dates as the first lien•. The Cotirt finds that the lien
....

.

. ......

Page2 of S

. release, which .''released the claim" for labor, materials. and/or equipment furnished on and between
.

.

..

·October 10, 2006 arid Apri130, 2008 1 extingtiisheE: Plaint:ifrs rigb£t~ file.~ second Hen (and
subsequent Amended Lien) for labor, materials, and/or equipment furnished on and between the above
stated dates. Therefore, the second lien and Amen.ded Lien are void as a matter oflaw. The fourth
cause of action- Lien foreclosure-is dismissed.
As to the breach of' contract claim, the Court finds that the parties agreed that a deed of trust
· ·. and promissory note woUld satisfy the first lien. The parties do not dispute the validity ofthe deed of

1:ttist or promissory note. Additionally, the parties do not dispute that the work was completed prior to
April3, 200:8, when the release of lien was filed. The Court finds that the Leavitts have satisfied the
requirements of accord and satisfaction; therefore, the breach of contract claim. is dismissed.
The Court will not address the factual question of whether or not GDE violated the Utah's
abuse
of )jen statute (Utah Code 38-1-25) because issues of disputed :material
facts remain. 'Iberefore, .
.
.

·. the Court Will not cotlsider, attbis ti:me, whether GDB' lienwas abusive. Such aquestion is one for
'

.

trial, not summary judgment, when issues of material fact-such as intent-are not resolved.
the claim for qua:ntum meruit, implied in. fact. is likewise denied. This Court found an
enforceable contract which was not breached. Therefore, this claim cannot sUrvive aga:inst either the
Leavitts or the Bank. Therefore, cause of action of quantum meruit; implied in fact, is dismissed.
· .· The Court finds that the guarantee signed by GDE is a valicl and enforceable con1tact for the
reasons argued by the Bank o£ American Fork :in its pleadings and at the hearing. Therefore, the Court

will grant attorney fees as provided for by contract.

Page3 of 5

.

.... -

.

The Court adopts and incorporates the arguments ofboth the Leavitts and the Bank of

American Fork in support of its findings and conclusions. Ms. Canfield and either Mr. Gardner or Mr.

seiier.~ .directed to PteP~-:F~ ~fFaet anlConclUsions ofuiw consistcmt with their pleadings
.

. .

,

:· .

,

·.. :· ·and ftrls rolilig.

DATED this

.

.

.

. I

,

;

..

.

.

.

.·

t:J.
____~,_,_-----J. zooiO

Z. 'Z-day of _ _

J

:· ...

.

-------------·--------------------- -···-··--·-----------·--·-·. -·· ....
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ADDENDUM NO.2
Summary Judgment Order

~

...

Thomas W. Seiler, #2910
Jamis M. Gardner, #11888
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

2500 North University Ave.
POBox 1266
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375~1920
Email: jmg@rsalawyers.com

Attorneys for Lorin & Dianne Leavitt
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GDE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING
GDE CONSTRUCTION'S CLAIMS,
. RELEASING ITS LIEN

AND LIS PENDENS, ORDERING IT TO

vs.

DIANNE W. LEAVITT, et al.,
Defendants.·. ·

AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED
ACTIONS, CROSS~CLAIMS AND
COUNTERCLAIMS.

REMOVE MOUNTAIN LAND
DESIGN'S LIEN, AND AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO BANK OF
AMERICAN FORK

Civil No. 080402840
Judge Steven L. Hansen

The Court has reviewed the Leavitts' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against
GDE Construction ("Leavitt Motion"), the Bank of American Fork's Motion for Summary
Judgment Against GDE Construction, Inc. ("BAF Motion'') (collectively the "Motions"), and all
memoranda

i? support, oppositions and replies thereto, heard oral argument on September 13,

2010, where counsel for GDE Construction, the Leavitts, and Bank of American Fork were
present and argued, issued the "RULING RE: Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and
Motions to Strike" ("Ruling") on October 26, 2010, bas been fully advised in the premises, and

for good cause appearing, does hereby enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

A.

The Parties, the Project, and the Agreements
1.

Diarme W. Leavitt is the owner of a home located at 1774 North High Country

Drive, Orem, Utah, more particularly described as: Lot 7, Hat "F", Cherapple Farms
Subdivision, Orem, Utah, according to the Official Plat thereof on file and of record in

the Utah County Recorder's Office ("Property").
2.

In approximately October of 2006, Lorin and Dianne Leavitt ("Leavitts") entered

into an agreement with GDE Construction, Inc. ("GDE'), whereby GDE, as general contractor,
·would provide contractor services for the remodeling of the Leavitts' home located on the
Property ("Project").

3.

Don Eldredge is the President of GDE, and Amy Eldredge is the Secretary for

GDE, and both are authorized to act on GDE's behalf.
4.

The agreement entered into

be~l'/een

the Leavitts and GDE in October of 2006

provided that in retum for their work on the Project, GDE would be paid on a cost plus 15%
basis. (''Agreement") .

. 5.

AB part of the Agreement, both parties originally agreed that the cost ofthe Project

would be approximately $900,000.
6.

In 2007, Bank of American Fork ("BAF') made two construction loans in the

principal amounts of $1,137,000 and $600,000 (collectively the "BAF Loans') to Dianne W.
Leav~ttin connection with the Project

7.

As security for the BAF Loans, Ms. Leavitt gave BAF two construction deeds of

2

trust which were recorded on the Property on February 15, 2007 as Entry 23665:2007 and on
December 6, 2007 as Entry 169460:2007, respectively, (collectively the "BAF Trust Deeds") in
the official records of the Utah County Recorder, pledging the Property and improvements
thereon as collateral for the BAF Loans in favor ofBAF as beneficiary.

8.

In connection with Ms. Leavitt obtaining the BAF Loans to finance the Project, for

each loan GDE, as Guarantor, executed a "Guaranty of Completion and Performance" dated,
respectively, February 9, 2007, for the loan in the principal amount of$1,137,000, and December

4, 2007, for the loan in the principal amount of $600,000 (collectively the "Guaranties"), each
for the benefit ofBAF.
9.

The only claim BAF has asserted against ODE in this action in its "Amended Answer and

Counterclaim of Defendant Bank of American Fork to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint" ("BAF's
Counterclaim") is for breach of the Guaranties of Completion and Performance.

B.·
10.

Disputes as to the Cost of the Project Existed Since the Beginning
Although the Leavitts believed 15% was a high percentage for a "cost plus"

contract in the industry, it was agreed to by the Leavitts because they understood that they would
not be charged for labor performed by GDE or GDE employees, including but not limited to,
framing and other labor performed. The Leavitts would be charged for any material that GDE
was required to provide. These terms were included in the Agreement.
11.

GDE denies that the Leavitts were not to be charged for framing labor, and its

invoices include amounts for framing labor..

12.

The dollar amount GDE was charging the Leavitts for the Project changed several

times during the construction period. The original estimate was for $900,000, which later

3

'

.

changed to $1,200,000, then changed again to $1,600,0000, and has subsequently increased
several times.
13.

When the Leavitts were infonned of the increase to $1,600,000 by Amy Eldredge,

a principal of GDE, the Leavitts were shoc:ked. They had not been given any warning or .
indication that there would be another price inc:rease, and certainly not such a large increase.
14.

In or about October of 2007,. despite the price changes from $900,000 to

$1,200,000 to $1,600,000, Amy Eldredge told the Leavitts that they would need another
$400,000 to complete the Project, and as a result, Lorin Leavitt requested a meeting.
15.

In October of 2007, Lorin Leavitt met with the principals of GDE, Don Eldredge

and Amy Eldredge ("GDE Principals") to discuss the balance of the cost of the Project

I

("October 2007 Meeting").

16.

'i;

I

At the October 2007 Meeting, Don Eldredge presented to Lorin Leavitt a

handwritten list of items still needing to be paid for on the Project, including items that were
completed and items that still needed to be completed, and it also showed a grand total ofhow
much was still owing at that time. The grand total of what was still owed as shown on the List
!

.was $1,005,788.15 (the "Lisf').

!

·!

17.

Prior to the October 2007 Meeting, the Leavitts were already in the process of

obtaining a second construction loan from Bank of American Fork for $600,000, which GDE
knew about, which loan was finalized on December 4, 2007; so practically, the amount that
would still be owed was approximately $400,000.

18.

At the October 2007 Meeting, the parties agreed that the Leavitts would pay

$400,000. The Leavitts would provide $150,000 up· front, and $250,000 would come from a

4

.

'

second mortgage after completion.
19.

GDE denies that the parties reached any. agreement related to $400,000 at the

October 2007 Meeting.
20.

Soon after the October 2007 Meeting, the Leavitts paid $150,000 to the bank which

was ultimately disbursed for Project costs.
21.

Since the October 2007 Meeting1 the Leavitts have also paid an additional

approximately $127,000 directly to subcontractors for Project costs.
22.

According to GDE, the total amount of the Project is now approximately $2.4

million.

C.
23.

Leavitts and GDE Reach an Accord, Which the Leavitts Satisfied
In March of 2008, the Leavitts and GDE Principals met again, at which meeting

GDE informed the Leavitts that GDE had recorded a lien on the property for $140,000 on March
18, 2008 ("First Lien").
24.

The First Lien was recorded as Entry 31368:2008 in the official records of the Utah

County Recorder.
25.

In its First Lien GDE claims it "furnished the first labor, materials and/or

equipment on October 10, 2006 and furnished the last labor; materials and/or equipment on April

30, 2008."
26.

The First Lien prevented the Leavitts from obtaining permanent financing.

27.

At the meeting in March of 2008 discussed above, when GDE presented the First

Lien which had been recorded, the Leavitts were willing to negotiate terms to be able to pay
GDE what GDE thought they were owed.

s

28.

Four days after the initial meeting regarding the First Lien, GDE produced a

promissory note and trust deed, and represented to the Leavitts that if the Leavitts signed the
documents, GDE would release the First Lien.
29.

On April2, 2008, GDE obtained from Mrs. Leavitt an executed a promissory note

in the principal amount of $150,000 ("Promissory Note"), as payment of the unpaid principal
balance owed to GDE for its work on the Pro~ect, which Note included the $140,000 previously
claimed in the First Lien ("GDE Debt").

30.

As security for the Promissory Note, GDE obtained the trust deed from Mrs.

Leavitt dated April 4, 2008, and recorded May 5, 2008 as Entry 20080018279 in the official
records of the Washington County Recorder (the "GDE Trust Deed"), pledging as collateral
other property owned by Dianne Leavitt in Washington County, State of Utah, more accurately
described as follows: CLIFFS OF SNOW CANYON H (SG) LOT 214.
31.

In order for GDE to agree to release First Lien, the Leavitts were required to sign

the Promissory Note. Once the Promissory Note was signed, the First Lien was to be released.

32.

GDE and the Leavitts agreed that Promissory Note and Trust Deed would satisfy

the First
Lien. GDE and the Leavitts do not dispute the validity of the Promissory Note and
r
Trust Deed.

33.

GDE accepted the Promissory Note as payment, as evidenced by its recordation of

the Trust Deed, and its attempt to enforce it through the Notice of Default.
34.
("Releas~

GDE prepared and recorded a Release of Mechanic's Lien on April 3, 2008

·.'

of Lie11").

35.

GDE and the Leavitts do not dispute that its work was completed prior to April 3,
6

.!
'

..

2008, when the Release of Lien was filed.
36.

GDE's intent in recording the Release of Lien was to release the First Lien, and

that was because GDE received the Promissory Note as payment of the GDE Debt in the
principal amount of $150,000, which amount included the $140,000 principal amount previous1y
claimed in its First Lien.
37.

The Release of Lien states: ''PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the Mechanic's Lien

claimed by GDE .. .is hereby released, the claim having been fully paid and satisfied and that the
.:

Mechanic's Lien... is hereby satisfied and discharged."
38.

D.
39.

GDE and the Leavitts reached an accord and satisfaction.

GDE Recorded Additional Liens For the Same Dates and Services
j

On or about July 10, 2008, the Leavitts discovered that on June 25,2008, GDE had

.

'

recorded another lien on the Property, this ;pne for $150,000, but alleging the same dates of
service as the First Lien ("Second Lien.,).
40.

'

The Second Lien was recorded as Entry 73098:2008 in the official records of the

Utah County Recorder.
41.

Even though the First Lien showed an amount owed of $140,000, and the Second

Lien showed $150,000, no additional work had been performed on the Project from the time of
the recording of the First Lien to the time of recording the Second Lien,. GDE had simply
recalculated the fees owed to it.
42.

According to GDE, the purpose of filing the Second Lien was because the terms of

the Promissory Note had not been met.
43.

According to GDE, if the Leavitts had paid the Promissory Note in full, then GDE

.·

7
,-

!

____

- - .. ----- .. -· ....____

,_

...

---·-····

-· .. -----

would not be owed anything and GDE's debt would have been satisfied in full.
44.

On July 16, 2008, GDE recorded an amended lien for $563,690.45, as Entry

80751:2008 in the official records of the Utah County Recorder ("Amended Lien").
45.

The Amended Lien claims the same dates of service GDE previously claimed in the

First Lien and Second Lien. .
46.
.

The Amended Lien, and the amounts claimed in this lawsuit, include the $150,000 ·
.

.

.

.

..

.

.

GDE claims it is owed and for which the Leavitts provided the Promissory Note.
47.

The Amended Lien also included additional unpaid amounts for sums purportedly

owed both to GDE subcontractors, and to other contractors or suppliers for the Project with
whom GDE claims it did not have any contract and to whom it owes nothing.
48.

GDE did not perform any new work on the Project from the time of recording of

the Second Lien to the time of recording the Amended Lien.
49.

GDE claims that if the Promissory Note had been paid, GDE would not be owed

anything now, including not the GDE Debt in the principal amount of $150,000, which is
claimed in the Amended Lien.
50.

On August 18, 2008, GDE caused to be recorded a Notice of Default and Election

to Sell, for the GDE Trust Deed, as Entry 20080032544 in the official records of the Washington
County Recorder ("Notice ofDefault").
51.

On August 18, 2008, GDE filed this action against the Leavitts, BAF and others.

52.

In its First Amended Complaint filed November 6, 2008 ("Amended Complaint"),

GDE brought claims for, as against Mrs. Leavitt, (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum
meruit/contract implied in fact, (3) quantum meruit/contract implied in law, each in the total

8

...

principal amount of $563,690.23, and, as against all parties, (4) to foreclose its Amended. Lien,
with a deficiency judgment as against Mrs. Leavitt for any resulting deficiency following
· foreclosure of its Amended Lien.
53.

The total principal amount GDE claims in this Action that the Leavitts owe to GDE

is the same $150,000 GDE Debt covered by the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, the Second
Lien and Amended Lien.
54.

The only claim GDE asserted in its Amended Complaint as against BAF is its lien

foreclosure claim;·.
.

E.
55.

.

.

.

~

.

GDE's Current Lien Claims Amounts That GDE Admits It Was Never Owed
The Amended Lien includes amounts owed for work and/or materials provided to

the Project by the following contractors with whom GDE claims it did not have any contract, has
no obligation to pay and has paid, in the following principal amounts:
a. Carl C. Nelson Painting:
b. Cascade Pool:
c. Cornaby Railing:
d. H&O Technologies:
e. Interiors Unlimited:
f. Lighting Specialists:
g. MBA Electric:
h. Mountain Land Design:
i. Orion Outdoor Lighting:
j. R&MWoods:
k. Total Protection:

$35,724.00
$5,324.00
$21,795.60
$96,434.65
$20,000.00
$21,687.51
$34,886.96
$24,132.41
$3,808.86
$54,950.00
$4,429.00

56. . According to GDE, it has no contract with any of the eleven contractors listed
above, it did not direct the work of any ofth~se c~ntractors, and yet, GDE stiil charged the 15%
general fee for each of the eleven contractors.
57.

GDE claims it did not owe any money to any of the eleven contractors listed above,

9
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..

but GDE intentionally included amounts claimed by them in its Amended Lien. GDE's reason
for claiming these amounts in its lien although such amounts

were not owed to it, was because

GDE·was afraid it might get sued.

58.

GDE was afraid it might get sued, but yet it Camlot recall whether any of the

contractors included in its Amended Lien had suggested or threatened they would sue at the time

GDE filed the Amended Lien.
59.

The total amount claimed by the eleven subcontractors mentioned above is

$323,172.99.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The First Lien was unambiguously released when GDE recorded the Release of
;'

LienpnApril3, 2008.
2.

Once a

lien

claimant · has unambiguously released a lien for · payme~t or

consideration, that claimant waives any rights to later lien for the same amounts, or property,
covered by the lien it released. See e.g., Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan

Co., 798 P.2d 738, 742, 752 (Utah 1990); First Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N Zundel and
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979); Zions First Nat. Bank v. Saxton, 493 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah
1972)~

3.

The Release of Lien, which "released the claim" for labor, materials and/or

equipment furnished on and between October 10, 2006 and April 30, 2008, extinguished

Plaintiff's right to file the Second Lien and subsequent Amended Lien for labor, materials,
and/or equipment furnished on and between the above stated dates.
4.

The Second Lien and Amend.ed Lien are void as a matter of law and its lien
. 10

.

foreclosure claim in its Amended Complaint therefore must be dismissed.
5.

Pursuant to the Release of Lien, GDE has waived any and all rights to maintaimng

any lien upon the Property in connection with the Project.

6.

Its liens being void and unenforceable as a matter of law, GDE does not have any

right to lien the Property, nor any right to receive or otherwise collect any amounts due from or

relating or pertaining in any way to work, services, equipment and/or materials that it allegedly
provided to the Property, or that any subcontractor, contractor or independent contractor
provided to the Property, or any part, parcel, and portion of the Property in connection with the
Project.
7.

There is a three-part test for accord and satisfaction: ''There must be (1) abona fide

dispute over an unliquidated amount, (2) a payment made in full settlement of the entire dispute,
and (3) an acceptance of the payment." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 84 P.3d 1154,
1158 (Utah 2003).

8.

There was a bona fide dispute between GDE and the Leavitts over the total amount

owed on the Project, which was an unliquidated amount.
. 9.

The Leavitts made a payment in full settlement of the entire dispute when it

provided to GDE the Promissory Note.
10.

A promissory note serves as full payment ofthe original debt if the parties so agree.

See Interstate Trust Co. v. Headlund, 51 Utah 543 (Utah 1918).

· 11.

The Release of Lien unequivocally reflects the parties' intent for the Promissory

Note to act as full payment of the First Lien: HPLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the Mechanic's
Lien claimed by GDE ... is hereby released, the claim having been fully paid and satisfied and
11

,.

-.
.

:

.

that the Mechanic's Lien... is hereby satisfied and discharged.'"
12.

GDE and the Leavitts having reached an accord and satisfaction, ODE's remaining

three claims in its Amended Complaint for breach of contract, quantum meruit/contract implied

in fact, and quantum meruit/contract implied in law must be dismissed.
13.

There are issues of disputed material facts which preclude a finding of summary

judgment on·the question of whether or uot GDE violated Utah's abuse of lien statute, Utah

..

Code§ 38-1-25.
14.

.

Having concluded that the Secqnd Lien and Amended Lien are void as a matter of

law, the issue of whether or not GDE violated Utah's one-action rule, Utah Code§ 78B-6-901, is
moot and need not be decided.

· 15.

Having concluded that the Second Lien and Amended Lien are void as a matter of

law, the issue of whether or not the Amended Lien should be found invalid or reduced because
GDE liened for amounts which GDE had not paid and which GDE claims it has no contract and
no obligation to pay, as argued in BAF's Motion and Memorandum in Support thereof, is moot
and need not be decided.
16.

GDE signed the Guaranties, and thereby absolutely guaranteed it would complete

the Project, among other things, free from any and all liens and encumbrances including
mechanics' liens and materialmens' liens• ......
17.

The Guaranties require GDE to pay for and obtain the release and discharge of any

and all mechanics' liens and materialmens' liens that were filed on the Property in connection
with the Project.
18.

The

Guar~ties

require GDE to pay BAF•s attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
12

'
·. i

enforcing the Guaranties, including the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the BAF
Motion, as well as attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the above-captioned lawsuit.

. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADruDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Motions are granted.

2.

The Amended Complaint filed by GDE is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

3.

GDE does not have any enforceable lien on the Property.

4.

The "Notice of Claim of Lien" recorded by GDE against the Property on June 25,

2008, as Entry No. 73098:2008, in the Office of the Utah County Recorder, is void and
unenforceable and is hereby released.

5.

The "Amended Lien" record~~ by GDE against the Property on July 16, 2008, as
.

.

Entry No. 80751:2008, in the Office of the Utah County Recorder, is void and unenforceable and
is hereby released.
6.

The "Notice of Lis Pendens" recorded by GDE against the Property on December

12, 2008, as Entry No. 130179:2008, in the Office of the Utah County Recorder, is null and void
and is hereby released.
7.

GDE does not have any right to lien the Property, nor any right to receive or

otherwise collect any amounts due from or relating or pertaining in any way to work, services,
equipment and/or materials that it allegedly provided to the Property, or that any subcontractor,
contractor or independent contractor provided to the Property, or any part, parcel, and portion of
the Property in cormection with the Project.._
~·~.

8.

GDE shall pay for and obtain the release of all liens recorded on the Property that

13

in any way relate to the Project, including, but not limited to, the "Amended Notice of
Mechanics Lien" recorded by Mountain Land Design, Inc. against the Property on June 18, 2008,
as Entry No. 70829:2008, in the Office of the Utah County Recorder.

9.

BAF is entitled to an award_.of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as against

GDE in the above~captioned action, and for bringing the BAF Motion, to be established by
attorneys fee affidavit.
10.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly

determines that there is no just reason for delay for entry of fmal judgment as to the claims of
GDEandBAF.
11.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the foregoing ruling

is certified as, and is, a .final order(s),judgmen.t(s), and decree(s) with respect to all matters stated
therein as between GDE and BAF, and as to all matters stated therein as claimed by GDE against
the Leavitts.
12.

A copy of this order may be recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder.

DATED this

9

.Hf day of

.
2J~?b,

.: -..:r... ~u. ,_,.4·._

DIST
' · ··- · JUDGE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this
foregoing

[proposed]

ORDER

_1L day of November, 2010, I caused a copy of the
DISMISSING

GDE

CONSTRUCTION'S

CLAIMS,

RELEASING ITS L1EN AND LIS PENDENS, ORDERING IT TO REMOVE MOUNTAIN
LAND DESIGN'S LIEN, AND AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO BANK OF

AMERICAN FORK to be sent via U.S. Mail to the following:
Randy B. Birch
114 South 200 West
POBox 763
Heber City, UT 84032

Felicia B. Canfield
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323
Attorneys for Bank ofAmerican Fork

· Daniel R. Widdison
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.

139 East South Temple, Suite 320

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for GDE Construction, Inc.
Thomas J. Scribner
SCRIBNER & MCCANDLESS, P.C.
2696 N. University Ave, Ste. 220
!'rovo, UT 84604
Attorneys for Home Office & Technologies

Paul P. Burghardt
Michael J. Howell
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

P.0. Box 2465
~alt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Attorneys for MBA Electric, LC
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Dana T. Fanner
Smith Knowles
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Attorneys for Mountain/and Design, Inc.

David P. Rose
Jason R. Hull
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys for Noorda Architectural Metals

..

••

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

TO:
Randy B. Birch
114 South 200 West
POBox 763
Heber City, UT 84032

Felicia B. Canfield
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323
Attorneys for Bank ofAmerican Fork

Daniel R. Widdison
BosTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
139 East South Temple, Suite 320

Dana T. Farmer
Smith Knowles
· 4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Attorneys for Mountain/and Design, Inc.

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for GDE Construction, Inc.

Thomas J. Scribner
SCRIBNER & MCCANDLESS, P.C.
2696 N. University Ave, Ste. 220
Provo, UT 84604
Attorn:eysfor Home Office & Technologies

David P. Rose
Jason R. Hull
Durham Jones & Pinegar
Ill East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys for Noorda Architectural Metals

Paul P. Burghardt
Michael J. Howell
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

. P.O. Box2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Af!orn_eys for MB'i Electric, LC
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for the Leavitts will submit the above and
foregoing [proposed] Order Dismissing GDE Construction's Claims, Releasing Its Lien and Lis
Pendens, Ordering it Remove Mountain Land Design's Lien, and Awarding Attorneys' Fees to
Bank of American Fork to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen for his signature upon the expiration
of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing, unless written objection
is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

_iL day ofNovember, 2010.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON
\

~.~-~·

J'HOMi§Vi. SEILER
JAMIS M. GARDNER
Attorneys for Lorin & Dianne Leavitt
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ADDENDUM NO.3
Order to Strike

NOV 1 5 20\0

Thomas W. Seiler, #291 0
Jamis M. Gardner, #1 1888
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

2500 North University Ave.
POBox 1266
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
Email: jmg@rsalnwyers.com

Attomeysfor Lorin & Dianne Leavill
IN THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GDE CONSTRUCTION, INC .•
Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER STRIKING GDE
CONSTRUCTION'S DEFENSE OF
MUTUAL MlSTAKE AND PORTJONS
OF THE DECLARATION OF
AMY ELDREDGE

DIANNE W. LEAVITT, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 080402840
Judge Steven L. Hansen

AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED
ACTIONS, CROSS-CLAIMS AND
COUNTERCLAIMS.
The Court has reviewed the Leavitts" Motion to Strike ( ..Leavitt Motio11"). the Bank of
American Fork's Motion to Strike Portions of the Declaration of Amy Eldredge ("BAF Motio11")
{collectively the "Motio11s to Stri/le'), and a11 mernorand<l in support, oppositions and replies
thereto, heard oral argument on September 13, 2010, where counsel for GDE Construction, the

Leavitts, and Bank of American Fork were present and argued, issued the "RULING RE:
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Motions to Strike" ("Ruling") on October 26, 2010,
has been fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, does hereby enter the

Exhibit

D

following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On Oct9ber 16,2008, the Leavitts filed a Verified Complaint against ODE, civil

no. 080403334, ("VerifUld Complaint") which was later consolidated with the above-captioned
matter.
2.

On December 4, 2008, ODE filed its Verified Answer for GDE Construction to

Verified Complaint of Lorin and Dianne Leavitt ("Verlfled Answer'}.
3.

The sworn verification in the Verified Answer was provided by Amy Eldredge, a

principal of GDE.
4.

On May 28, 2010, the Lcavitts filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Against GDE Construction and their accompanying Memorandum in Support.

S.

On June I, 2010, BAF filed its Motion for Summary Judgment Against GDE

Construction, Inc and its accompanying Memorandum in Support.
6.

On June 28, 2010, GDE filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the Leavins:•

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Opposition"), as well as its Memorandum h1

Opposition to Bank of American Fork's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it also
incorporated its Opposition to the Leavitts' Motion.
7.

On June 30,2010, GDE filed the Declaration of Amy Eldredge in Opposition to the

Leavitts' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GDE ("Declaration").
8.

Leavitts and BAF filed their respective Motions to Strike, set forth above, in

response to the Declaration.

9.

In GDE's Opposition, GDE raised the affirmative defense of mutual mistake for the
2

first time in this case. ODE had never raised the defense or made any allegation or averment
related to mistake or mutual mistake in any of its prior pleadings or filings in this action.
10.

In paragraph S of the Declaration, Amy Eldredge made the following statement: "'I

was told by the Leavitts that the only condition precedent to lhe granting of a loan by Citywide

Home Loans was the release ofthe First Lien."
II.

Jn paragraph 6 of the Declaration, Amy Eldredge also states: "GDE did not expect

the Leavitts to make payments pursuant to the Promissory Note but expected to be paid &om the
proceeds ofthe refinancing of the Leavins' property."

12. The Verified Complaint filed by the Leavitts alleged, in paragraph 28:
Plaintiffs informed Defendant that it would be impossible for Plaintiffs to meet
the terms of the Promissory Note. Defendant assured Plaintiffs that they could
work out other terms, rllat Defendant would not actflally expect Plaintiffs to make
the $15.000 illitial paymelll. nor the $10,000 nromhly pa)'mellls as prol1idedfor in
the Promissory Note, but that Defendant needed something signed in order to
release the First Lien.
(emphasis added).
13. The Verified Answer filed by ODE, in paragraph 28 {in response to paragraph 28
ofthe Verified Complaint), states: "Denied."
14. On November 5, 2009, Amy Eldredge was placed under oath in a scheduled
30(b)(6) deposition ofGDE. During the deposition, Amy Eldredge testified:
Q. And why did you record this notice of mechanic's lien?

A. Because nothing had happened on the promissory note.
Q. So because you had not been paid on the promissory note you recorded another

mechanic's lien.

3

A. Yes.
15. On November 3, 2009, Don Eldredge was placed under oath in a scheduled
30(b)(6) deposition ofGDE. During the deposition, Don Eldredge testified:

Q. And what was the purpose ofthis promissory note?

A. To set up payments for the general contractor fee.

Q. So were you involved in the decision making process that resulted in this
notice of mechanic's lien being filed?

A. Yes.
Q. And what was the purpose of filing this - I'll can it a second lien.

A. Because this one was- the tenns of the promissory note had not been met.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties "shall set forth

affinnatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affinnative defense." Ut. R. Civ.1•.
S(c).

2.

A catchall statement does not comply with the purpose of Rule S(c), whose purpose

is put the opposing party on notice of what the party claims as defenses.
3.

"Mutual mistake is an affinnative defense as it raises matters outside the plaintiffs'

prima facie case, and the failure to assert it is a waiver of that defense." Mabey "· Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1984) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c}, 12(h); Phillips v. JCM
Development Corp., Utah, 666 P.2d 876 (1983).
4.

"Rule 9{b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] requires that in all avennents of
4

mistake, the circumstances constituting mistake shaJI be stated with particularity.'' /d.
S.

In GDE's Opposition, GDE raised the affinnative defense of mutual mistake for the

first time in this case. GDE had never raised the defense or made any allegation or avcnnent
related to mistake or mutual mistake in any of its prior pleadings or filings in this action.
6.

The affirmative defense of mutual mistake has been waived by GDE.

7.

An affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and which

are based on personal knowledge. Ut. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
8.

"An affidavit that does not measure up to the standards of [Rule] 56(e) [of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure] is subject to a motion to strike." Howick v. Ba11k ofSalt Lake, 28 Utah
2d 64, 66 (Utah 1972).
9.

ParagraphS of the Declaration is based on inadmissible double hearsay.

I 0.

Paragraph 6 of the Declaration is inconsistent with prior statements made by the

principals of GDE. Amy Eldredge and Don Eldredge, and pertains to the affinnative defense of
mutual mistake.

11. The inconsistency of the statements in the Declaration is a question of fact and goes
to credibility, not admissibility.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Motions to Strike are granted in part. and denied in part.

2.

GDE waived the affirmative defense ofmuluat mistake in this action.

3.

Paragraph 5 ofthe Declaration is stricken.

4.

All portions of the Declaration and Opposition which were filed in support of

s

GDE's attempt to claim an affirmative defense of mutual mistake will not be considered.

5.

Paragraph 6 of the Declaration will not be considered as it pertains to GDE's

nttempt to claim an affirmative defense of mutual mistake.

QA.TEP this~ day of

ffic2v e tM. foev; 201 o.
BY THE COURT:

{s \
HON. STEVEN L. HANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ADDENDUM NO.4
Utah R. App. P. 11

Rule 11. The record on appeal.

(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial
court, including the presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if
any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court
to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only
those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the
appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall
securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following order:
(b )(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet;
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order;
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report.
(b )(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the collated index,
docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page only of all published
depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the record
with a sequential number using one series of numerals for the entire record.
(b )(2)(8) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate
the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as
the original record and mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated original
papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only
of each volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential
number beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the
original record.
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a
reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court
and the starting page of the record on which the paper, deposition or transcript will be
found.
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for
checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an
appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that
more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to enable the
clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record shall be

transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of
the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion
or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include all of the papers in a civil case
as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte
motion or motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of
the record.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial
transcript is ordered.
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant shall, order the transcript(s) online at www.utcourts.gov, specifying the entire
proceeding or parts of the proceeding to be transcribed that are not already on file. If the
appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant shall include the request
for a compressed format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the
proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate
to that effect with the clerk of the appellate court.
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence re!garding challenged finding or conclusion. If the
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript.
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to
be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a
statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a
copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a
transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10
days after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file
and serve on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within
10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has
so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the
parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in
paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case,
showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the trial court
and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as
are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it,
together with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the
issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court

shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by
Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of
the appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is
unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if
a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a
transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or
proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be
served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall
be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record
truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and
settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to
either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary
that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it
is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed
changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed
changes. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to
the appellate court.
Advisory Committee Notes
The rule is amended to make applicable in the Supreme Court a procedure of the Court of
Appeals for preparing a transcript where the record is maintained by an electronic recording
device. The rule is modified slightly from the former Court of Appeals rule to make it the
appellant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsibility to arrange for the preparation of the
transcript.

ADDENDUM NO.5
Utah R. App. P. 24

Rule 24. Briefs.

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which
appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(8) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is !lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the
brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(?) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall
be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an
award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under
this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes
the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:

(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion;
in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if
the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of
the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (1 0) of this rule. No
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant"
and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received
or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs.
(f)(1) Type-volume limitation.
(f)(1)(A) A principal brief is acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it uses
a monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text; and a reply brief is
acceptable if it contains no more than 7',000 words or it uses a monospaced face and
contains no more than 650 lines of text.
(f)(1)(B) Headings, footnotes and quotations count toward the word and line limitations,
but the table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum containing statutes, rules,

regulations or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule do not count
toward the word and line limitations.
(f)(1)(C) Certificate of compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(f)(1) must include a
certificate by the attorney or an unrepresented party that the brief complies with the
type-volume limitation. The person preparing the certificate may rely on the word or line
count of the word processing system used to prepare the brief. The certificate must state
either the number of words in the brief or the number of lines of monospaced type in the
brief.
(f)(2) Page limitation. Unless a brief complies with Rule 24(f)(1), a principal briefs shall
not exceed 30 pages, and a reply briefs shall not exceed 15 pages, exclusive of pages
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes,
rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule.
In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of
briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing
a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised
in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the
issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of
Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to
the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(g)(5) Type-Volume Limitation.
(g)(5)(A) The appellant's Brief of Appellant is acceptable if it contains no more than
14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text.
(g)(5)(B) The appellee's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it
contains no more than 16,500 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more
than 1,500 lines of text.
(g)(5)(C) The appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee is
acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and
contains no more than 1,300 lines of text.
(g)(5)(D) The appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it contains no
more than half of the type volume specified in Rule 24(g)(5)(A).
(g)(6) Certificate of Compliance.
A brief submitted under Rule 24(g)(5) must comply with Rule 24(f)(1)(C).
(g)(?) Page Limitation.
Unless it complies with Rule 24(g)(5) and (6), the appellant's Brief of Appellant must not

exceed 30 pages; the appellee's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 35 pages; the
appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 30 pages; and the
appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, 15 pages.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for
good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the page,
word, or line limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be
briefed, the number of additional pages, words, or lines requested, and the good cause for
granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days prior to the date the brief is due or
seeking three or fewer additional pages, 1,400 or fewer additional words, or 130 or fewer
lines of text need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed within seven
days of the date the brief is due and seeking more than three additional pages, 1,400
additional words, or 130 lines of text shall be accompanied by a copy of the finished brief. If
the motion is granted, the responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional
pages, words, or lines without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal,
any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.

0) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come
to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter
setting forth the citations. An original lette!r and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall
be a reference either to the page of the! brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within seven
days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
Advisory Committee Notes

Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley,
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah
1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play
the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty... , the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."'
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53
(Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic lnv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rei. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216,
1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore,
802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).

The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable
standard of review and citation of supporting authority.

ADDENDUM NO.6
Utah R. Civ. P. 7

Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders.

(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an
answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a
person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a
third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed,
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be
made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought.
(b )(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show
cause shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating
an existing order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an
affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or
ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days
after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall
file a memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in
opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be
considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial
memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of
the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the
court. The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte
application and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists.
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's
facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for
any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall
be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such
as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of
contents and a table of authorities with page references.

(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of
documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date thH opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a
hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request
for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a
motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the
court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been
authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in
the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any
order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge
who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within
five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon
being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
Advisory Committee Notes

ADDENDUM NO.7
Utah R. Civ. P. 15

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permc;sion may be granted even though the original pleading is defective
in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

